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Abstract
Interjurisdictional cooperation has emerged as a major recent trend in China
in response to challenges from market reforms and globalization. However,
given that cities are in fierce competition with one another, interjurisdic-
tional cooperation presents many difficulties for policy making. This
paper attempts to examine how cooperative partnerships can be developed,
sustained, or even resisted. It uses the Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway as a case
study to explore the institutional configuration of such a practice and to
understand how the historical contingencies and path-dependencies in a
transitional society interact with intensive bargaining to influence partner-
ship building. It argues that the lack of a formal institutional framework
to facilitate horizontal networking forces actors to opt for ad hoc collabora-
tive arrangements. With the objective of making joint projects workable,
commitments for cooperation have to be negotiated on a case-by-case
basis through extensive bargaining. Although this creates much flexibility
in consensus building, it does not guarantee success: success depends on
the interplay of inter-ministry politics, interscalar relations, intercity politics
and state–market relations. To a certain extent, the Chinese state can go
beyond economic logic and shore up its legitimacy by prioritizing develop-
ment. The post-reform path-dependencies can provide current political lea-
ders with more rather than fewer instruments with which to negotiate
interjurisdictional projects, and thus have greater influence over urban and
regional economic governance.
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In the past three decades, cities and provinces in China have been in fierce com-
petition with one another for foreign investment and economic growth.1 However,
in order to address the challenges presented by market reforms and globalization
in recent years, there seems to be an emerging trend of cooperation.2 Cooperative
partnerships, and ways in which they can be developed and sustained, are critical
elements of contemporary strategies to improve urban and regional governance.
This is particularly true for trans-territorial infrastructure, a vital social and econ-
omic resource that configures territorial space and re-articulates regional mobility
and trade flow, as well as industrial and residential locations.
China’s policy framework is disjointed,3 and the functional division of auth-
ority among various bureaucracies in combination with economic decentraliza-
tion has created a high degree of “fragmented authoritarianism.”4 Such
fragmentation has become structurally built in, and has grown increasingly pro-
nounced during the reform period. No single city has authority over any other.
This complex set-up provokes conflicting views on how to achieve cooperation
in a highly fragmented political environment. On the one hand, some see “con-
solidation” as an effective tool to organize and control an array of local agencies,
and favour strategies of municipal annexation, merger, and consolidation to
encourage urban partnership.5 On the other hand, there is an argument to pro-
mote the “survival of the fittest” and to encourage more direct competition
between localities in order to achieve efficiency in regional infrastructure pro-
vision.6 Between these two extremes is the “governance approach” which stresses
the importance of varying institutional and policy frameworks of public–private
partnerships and cross-sectoral alliances.7
The consolidation approach is excessively bureaucratic and vulnerable to ideo-
logical criticism and strong local resistance because it lacks political legitimacy
and operates in an authoritarian manner.8 The fragmentationist approach, deeply
rooted in a neoliberal tradition, leads to hyper-competition between cities. This cre-
ates inefficiencies and inequities in service provision such as infrastructure.9
Conceptually, the governance approach provides a good institutional framework
in regional cooperation and generates benefits which offset some of the costs of
1 Zhao 2002; Xu and Yeh 2005.
2 Zhang and Wu 2006; Luo and Shen 2006.
3 Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007.
4 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992.
5 Zhang and Wu 2004.
6 Zhao 2002.
7 Zhang and Wu 2004, 25–26.
8 Zhang and Wu 2006.
9 Xu and Yeh 2005.
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competition. However, the general lack of institutional structures, such as councils
of governments, makes this difficult to achieve.10 As a result, informal alliances
between governments and joint projects are increasingly used for interjurisdictional
cooperation.11 Joint projects in particular are embarked upon with swift and ever-
increasing frequency. Reasons for this include the rising degree of polycentricity of
city-regions; increasing local discretion; and the growing pressure of globalization
and market reforms giving rise to forces that break out of administrative barriers to
create denser socio-economic interdependencies among urban regions and develop-
ment projects approaching or crossing territorial boundaries. Governments for-
merly concerned with their own policy alternatives and receiving orders and
directives from above are now faced with the prospect of having to form alliances.
However, forming partnerships is not an easy task in a highly fragmented pol-
icy framework. One way to do so is through extensive bargaining.12 This paper
attempts to reveal the dynamics of interjurisdictional cooperation through bar-
gaining by using the Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway (GZR), which has undergone
more than 25 years of negotiation since 1985, as a case study. We examine how
the historical contingencies and path-dependencies in a transitional society inter-
act with intensive bargaining to influence partnership building. Our major argu-
ment is that a deficient institutional structure for horizontal networking forces
actors to opt for ad hoc collaborative arrangements. This creates much flexibility
but also allows current political forces to have a greater influence over urban and
regional governance. GZR is a large cross-boundary project. We have chosen this
case because efforts to realize it provide an unusually instructive window on the
patterns of influence in regional development politics. GZR required a large com-
mitment of public resources, incurred losses for some interests and promised great
benefits for others. The stakes were high, and the struggles over project author-
ization, planning and implementation drew in many actors who tried to protect
their own interests. The GZR case is considered by many Chinese city planners as
one of the best known and typical examples of cooperation through bargaining
and offers a circumspect appraisal of the institutional configuration and bargain-
ing politics involved in consensus-building. Using GZR as a case study will help
us to understand the divergent and ad hoc pathways of interjurisdictional
cooperation, and shed light on how to establish responsive institutions for differ-
ent political and economic entities to sanction economic prosperity as well as to
achieve multi-scalar political equanimity through cooperation.
The Institution and Politics of Interjurisdictional Cooperation in China
Interjurisdictional cooperation was barely possible in China during the pre-
reform period. A frequently asked question is why, given the strong top–down
10 Bollens and Schmandt 1982; Xu 2008.
11 Luo and Shen 2006.
12 Lampton 1992.
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control in a centrally-planned economy? Under state socialism, horizontal
relationships between cities were not considered important and vertical linkages
with central ministries were more prominent. This system was related to the pre-
reform regime of accumulation, where the central state was the primary geo-
graphical scaffolding of accumulation and redistribution. Regional projects
were undertaken by line ministries, with little urban and interscalar networking.
This regime has undergone massive reorganization since economic reform in
1978, and now cities and regions are used as strategic sites for accumulation
and regulation. Policies are designed to increase levels of urbanization, encourage
intercity collaboration, and create competitive mega-city regions. There are at
least two reasons why interjurisdictional relationships have become much more
complex and extensive during the reform era. First, the regime shift has generated
forces that push new actors (e.g. cities and non-state actors) into more direct con-
tact with each other. The former state system has been penetrated by the market,
by international regimes and by the growing discretion of local states. Political
agendas are dominated by complex economic and development issues that
arise from greater interdependencies and many trade-offs. A large number of
cross-boundary issues have emerged creating a growing need for interjurisdic-
tional cooperation, while at the same time there has been a relative decline in
the use of hierarchical command and an increase in the use of market mechan-
isms. Secondly, the needs of administrative entities are legitimized. With econ-
omic decentralization, these entities have become powerful organizations in
their own right: one city cannot perform an undertaking by compelling others
to cooperate. Yet, an institutional structure for city networking has not been
established. There is thus a significant increase in the use of negotiation, which
further intensifies the process of bargaining. This is most in evidence when a
joint project is carried out.
A joint project is a common form of interjurisdictional partnership. It requires
the agreement and participation of more than one government in order to pro-
ceed. The number of participants complicates a project’s decision-making
process. Political scientists have observed that joint projects with a high degree
of complexity and multiple trade-offs have to be executed via a bureaucratic bar-
gaining system. This bargaining system comprises an enriched and highly com-
plex set of bargaining relationships between agents in different functional
systems as well as between different scales of government.13 Post-reform con-
ditions have not reduced bargaining, but rather intensified its process. Indeed,
bargaining is critical to the functioning of the Chinese economic and political sys-
tem, especially when there is no mechanism to resolve conflicts between indepen-
dent localities. In a sense, bargaining allows different localities and bureaucracies
to negotiate over resources and to insert their functional importance in urban–
regional governance.
13 Lampton 1992, 33–35.
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When negotiating with others, a city should theoretically consider its own cost–
benefit criteria for project acceptance. This forms the basic precondition for con-
sidering collaboration. However, there are some unique characteristics that come
into play when making policy decisions in China. First, owing to the soft budget
constraint syndrome, local governments often go beyond their budgetary and
legal constraints and economic logic to mobilize resources aggressively and
make arbitrary decisions in a bargaining process.14 Secondly, historical contin-
gencies and path-dependencies tend to create externalities for interjurisdictional
cooperation. For instance, the traditional socialist principle requires that “local
interests should obey national or regional interests.” Cities are possibly forced
to sacrifice their own potential benefit in order to fulfil regional agendas, even
when there is little incentive for them to cooperate. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the historical legacies of the post-socialist institution continue to affect
interjurisdictional cooperation. In many circumstances, cities must coordinate
policy but lack the established mechanisms to network horizontally. National
laws do not require adjacent cities to cooperate, nor does the central state offer
any incentive to forge such cooperation.15 This leads to various ad hoc measures
being used to resolve conflicts in both the formulation and implementation
phases of decision making.
We use four institutional dimensions to reveal the manifold activities of differ-
ent functional and territorial administrations and their complex interactions. The
first dimension is related to inter-ministry politics. The central structure for coor-
dinating regional projects is a legacy of state socialism. It is highly fragmented,
being divided into different ministries. Each ministry stipulates a sectoral plan
for the infrastructure sector in charge. However, planning and investment
decisions have to be made through inter-ministerial networking, where the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and other functional
bureaucracies (e.g. finance, highway, railway, planning, environment and land
administration) negotiate towards a working consensus. These ministries are con-
stitutionally at the same administrative level and no one ministry has authority
over another. This leads to inter-ministerial rivalries and complex political man-
oeuvring in practice. Although highly fragmented, the central policy system also
serves as a buffer since it allows one or a few affected units to postpone a project
for substantial periods of time, thus leading to a wide range of measures to
heighten coordination and to overcome the fragmentation of authority.16 To a
certain extent, the central state still serves as an important level of economic regu-
lation. It has also been an essential institutional focal point around which various
policies and decisions have been articulated.
The second dimension is interscalar relations. Post-reform transition has pro-
foundly modified inherited scalar arrangements. Previously, the central state
14 Xu and Yeh 2005.
15 Xu 2008, 168–170.
16 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 141–42.
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hegemony was naturalized. Nowadays, many state functions are being rearticu-
lated downwards to local governments, establishing a redefined interscalar
regime, through which project planning and investment decisions are negotiated,
evaluated and regulated both discursively and materially between different tiers
of governments. This policy process is often punctuated by persistent struggles
to impose or transform policies, to directly influence the exercise of regulatory
power on one or more scales, to escape or bypass the exercise of such power
by jumping scales to upper levels, or to influence it through struggles that are
conducted in the name of new political and economic legitimacy.
An investigation into the third dimension, intercity politics, reveals the efforts
of local state regimes to engage or disengage from particular partnerships and
obligations in planning and financing regional transportation projects which
cut across jurisdictional boundaries. This is in contrast with the increasing
local discretion in planning negotiation, the rising use of locally raised funds to
support capital investment, and the politics of distributing investment responsibil-
ities among jurisdictions. It might prove difficult to rely on local planning efforts
and funding sources as a means to improve mega-city regions’ infrastructure,
except to the extent that the regional and municipal interests overlap.
The fourth dimension, state–market relations, needs a careful reading in post-
reform China. The state has not retreated because of market reform; rather,
it continues to play a critical role in economic development. This should not
be read as a legacy of state socialism. There has been a substantial change in
the nature of state intervention because state function is redefined by the impera-
tive of market development, making the state fundamentally different from
before. For example, the state can use market instruments to solve its own crises
(e.g. shortage of capital) and to externalize its responsibilities (e.g. infrastructure
development invites the participation of non-state actors). This opens up a new
window through which to view the high degree of risk-sharing, rights-sharing
and obligation-sharing between partners in a joint project.
In the following sections, these four institutional dimensions of interjurisdic-
tional cooperation are used to examine the bargaining process of the GZR
project.
Interjurisdictional Cooperation through Bargaining of Chinese Railway
Development
Chinese railways are state-owned. They are provided and controlled by the
Ministry of Railways (MOR). Railways also traverse administrative boundaries,
and analysing how decisions are made in this field during a railway investment
boom will help to reveal the bargaining process of interjurisdictional cooperation.
Before studying the case in detail, we will briefly review the normal institutional
process in developing a railway, which reflects all four dimensions discussed in
the previous section (see Figure 1).
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Inter-ministry politics
MOR has complex relationships with other ministries, and in particular with
NDRC which is in charge of project approval to ensure that any project is con-
sistent with national plans and policies.17 However, NDRC and MOR have pol-
icy discrepancies. For instance, NDRC requires that major investment be placed
in the western regions of China in accordance with the national “go west” policy.
However, MOR would prefer to maximize its return by investing in more pros-
perous mega-city regions, such as the Pearl and Yangtze river deltas, and becom-
ing the primary shareholder of key projects in these regions.
Interscalar relations
The monopoly of MOR and the pressure to change this situation has redefined
the interscalar relationships of hierarchical governments. MOR has 16 railway
bureaus and two railway companies directly under its auspices. It is through
these organizations that MOR operates its monopoly. Institutionally, this places
MOR in an advantageous position in negotiations with local governments.
Localities can initiate a railway plan, but they have to seek the support of
Figure 1: An Ad Hoc Institutional Arrangement in Developing a Railway through
Province–Ministry Cooperation
17 Luger 2008.
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MOR which monopolizes rail services and profit distribution through its clearing
centre. One key strategy for cities is to invite MOR to become the controlling
shareholder of a rail project. This is an effective way to guarantee sufficient pas-
sengers and cargos.
From the MOR perspective, there are financial reasons for partnering with
lower level governments. Prior to 2004, the budget for new railway construction
came from a surcharge on freights. Although the total surcharge has increased
steadily, it is far from sufficient to cover the expenses of MOR’s ambitious
Mid-to-Long Term Railway Network Plan. Since 2004, MOR has had to find
other sources to raise the necessary funds. As a result, the Province–MOR
Agreement (shengbu xieyi 省部协议) (PMA) has increasingly been used to
finance railway investment. However, in order to protect its power base, MOR
has to negotiate with local governments to ensure that its share of the total invest-
ment is not drastically reduced. There is no standard protocol for cooperation
and each project entails a different deal, with ad hoc sharing arrangements
worked out by the province concerned and MOR. A project company will
then be set up, through which both parties negotiate with low-level territorial
and bureaucratic actors to decide on critical issues such as line alignment and
investment allocation. This negotiation process is critical because any regional
project requires the active cooperation of local officials. Normally, it is not
easy for local officials to refuse a demand from high-level bureaucrats, but all
parties concerned realize that the locales must be persuaded into cooperation;
otherwise, they are capable of generating perpetual delays during the construc-
tion of a project.18 Negotiations for new railways are particularly complex and
delicate, as not only do they require the relocation of people and land use
changes, but they also often disproportionately benefit those who have contribu-
ted the largest share.
Intercity politics
Bargaining is also intense among the different cities concerned. Negotiations
focus on several issues, but particularly on investment allocation and line
route. City status plays a key role in intercity politics as Chinese cities are
hierarchically organized into five levels: provincial, sub-provincial, prefecture,
sub-prefecture, and county. This tiered city status defines two fundamental
parameters of intercity cooperation: (1) different governments may not be on
equal footing in ranking, causing unbalanced political representation in many
regional projects; and (2) government relations are often (re)articulated through
a hierarchical structure, while lacking a mechanism to forge horizontal collabor-
ation. To complicate this state of affairs further, other salient features of politics,
such as “administrative capital,” play a large role in decision making. The
18 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 157–58.
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unofficial system of high-ranking officials or individuals adjoined by guanxi (关
系, personal connections) allows bureaucrats to make personal agreements with
the central state or with low-level actors. This can change a policy decision, mak-
ing conditions favourable for a joint project.
State–market relations
The state–market relationship in railway development is a tricky one. Non-state
investors (e.g. mining companies) have expressed an interest in investing in and
running railway lines,19 but this is not always workable owing mainly to
MOR’s monopoly in line construction and service operation. The response
from MOR is also unenthusiastic, even though it has said that non-state actors
are permitted to invest in the sector in order to relieve MOR of the financial bur-
den of line construction.
Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway (GZR)20
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) is a polycentric mega city-region in Guangdong. It
comprises nine municipalities with a total population of more than 50 million.21
Since the economic reforms, PRD cities have been under mounting pressure to
take an entrepreneurial stance in order to prosper under intensive intercity com-
petition. Bordering Macau, Zhuhai 珠海 is one of two pioneering special econ-
omic zones in the PRD; the other is the more economically vibrant Shenzhen
深圳, located next to Hong Kong. Lagging infrastructure development was per-
ceived as the main cause of Zhuhai’s sluggish growth. In 1985, the city’s Party
secretary proposed to open a rail link from Zhuhai to Guangzhou, providing pas-
senger and cargo services (see Figure 2). The project was first estimated to cost
approximately US$650 million, with a length of 142 kilometres, commencing
in Guangzhou and ending in Zhuhai. It would be served by six stations covering
the four municipalities it passed through: Guangzhou, Foshan 佛山, Jiangmen
江门 and Zhuhai. A further extension could be added to connect to Macau. In
Guangzhou, the track would connect to the national railway system, and its term-
inal in Zhuhai was expected to link with Gaolan高栏 Port.22 From its first incep-
tion in 1985, a number of problems slowed the project down in its planning phase
(see Table 1). From interviews conducted with various planners and government
officials, we have identified the areas of contention that became the foci of pro-
tracted bargaining: the justification; local opposition; investment allocation;
19 Luger 2008.
20 Information in this section, unless otherwise stated, is from several reliable sources including govern-
ment officials, planners and scholars in Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Foshan, Jiangmen and Beijing. All infor-
mants are directly involved in or have studied GZR and have first-hand materials and information. A
full list of interviews is available from the authors upon request.
21 Yeung, Shen and Zhang 2005.
22 NDRC 2004.
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project approval; and the issue of participation of non-state actors. These issues
reflect various institutional dimensions of interjurisdictional cooperation.
The justification: why should this railway be built?
The bargaining process over the project’s rationales illustrates the sophisticated
nature of interscalar politics. GZR was initially proposed by Zhuhai, based on
the consideration that Zhuhai was the only city among the five special economic
zones and 20 major port cities in China that lacked a railway. Without proper
economic justification, there was intense controversy over why this project should
be built. Zhuhai’s Party secretary was a well-known cadre with an extensive per-
sonal network in the bureaucratic system. He was ranked second to Deng
Xiaoping in the 1993 “Ten People of the Year in China.” He was also a member
of the standing committee of the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, the
highest decision-making body in Guangdong. Through his connections and liai-
son with the central government, GZR gained the support of the deputy minister
of railways. In 1993, the State Council authorized the project. In 1994, the State
Figure 2: Regional Transportation Network in the PRD and the Proposed GZR
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Planning Commission (the predecessor of NDRC) approved the feasibility study.
Clearly, in an effort to win project approval, the Zhuhai Party secretary relied on
his administrative capital to impose the decision and to bypass the province and
other cities concerned by jumping directly to the centre for authorization.
Following central approval, Guangdong had to give its consent, but made it
clear that the province would not invest in the railway because highways, rather
than railways, were seen as the priority for provincial investment. Zhuhai then
had to raise the project funds, but failed. In 1998, the Party secretary of
Zhuhai resigned from his post, and the project was officially halted in 1999.
Table 1: Project Timeline and Major Events of GZR
Phase I (1985–1999): Early Inception
1985 Party secretary of Zhuhai proposes to open a rail link from Zhuhai to Guangzhou
to provide both passenger and cargo service
1992 Zhuhai’s Party secretary becomes member of the standing committee of
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee
1993 Project approved by the State Council
1994 Feasibility study approved by the State Planning Commission
1997 Project company formed by Zhuhai, Jiangmen and MOR; construction begins;
completion set for 2001
1998 Zhuhai’s Party secretary resigns
1999 Construction ceases because of shortage of capital
Phase II (2000–2003): Stalemate
2000 Another passenger rail, Guangzhou–Zhuhai Light Rail, proposed as one part of
the PRD intercity railway network; one deputy governor objects to GZR
2001 Project company carries out a supplementary feasibility study
2002–2004 Zhuhai and Jiangmen’s deputies of national and provincial people’s congress
propose to re-start the construction of GZR
2002–2004 Zhuhai’s attempts to lobby the central and provincial governments and to
re-negotiate with Jiangmen and Foshan all fail
2003 Zhuhai’s attempts to invite investors for GZR fail
Phase III (2003–present): Resumption of Bargaining
2003 Guangdong’s Party secretary decides to develop railways in Guangdong; Zhuhai
seizes this chance to lobby Guangdong to include GZR into provincial railways
development plan; Guangdong’s Party secretary and the railways minister agree
to facilitate GZR project under PMA scheme; Guangdong’s Party secretary goes
to Foshan to elicit their cooperation
2004 Zhuhai successfully lobbies MOR to invest in GZR; GZR designated as one of 9
railway projects under PMA scheme in Guangdong; Zhuhai, Jiangmen and
Foshan resume dialogue
2005–2006 Zhuhai, Jiangmen, Foshan, Guangdong and MOR negotiate investment share and
route; project re-designed as a cargo rail; proposal fails the national
environmental impact assessment and land use permits refused; new feasibility
study sent to central ministries for approval
Since 2007 New project company formed; construction completed in 2012; GZR opened for
operation end of 2012.
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The essence of the problem was that as the project proceeded doubts regarding
its financial return grew more intense. Some senior provincial leaders opposed the
project, which raised political conflicts. This was especially true towards the latter
half of the 1990s, when another new passenger railway line, the Guangzhou–
Zhuhai Express Light Rail, was planned as part of the provincial government’s
efforts to build a US$13 billion intercity fast rail network connecting the major
cities in the PRD. Beginning construction in 2005 and opening in 2010, this
new railway has a distance of 140 kilometres and cost US$2.52 billion. It passes
through Guangzhou, Foshan, Zhongshan 中山, and Zhuhai, with a branch line
from Zhongshan to Jiangmen.23 It is a joint project under the PMA scheme
between MOR and Guangdong. Those who opposed GZR argued that the
new Express Light Rail line would snatch passenger traffic away and would
make GZR financially unviable.
Perhaps it was because GZR was so crucial to increasing the accessibility of
Zhuhai that the city had a much more optimistic estimate of its financial return
which was well above that of the provincial authorities. In this kind of bargaining
situation, Zhuhai, the proponent, had to puff up the benefits and tried to influ-
ence provincial and central decisions. This was done by using a couple of strat-
egies. First, Zhuhai carried out another feasibility study to demonstrate that
there would be sufficient passengers and enough cargo to cover the operating
costs of GZR, and that the railway could help to meet the growing transportation
demand in the western part of the PRD. Secondly, the city continued to mobilize
all kinds of resources to lobby provincial and central authorities for their support.
One consequence of this intensified effort was that 69 deputies from the national
and provincial people’s congress from Zhuhai and Jiangmen jointly proposed to
resume the GZR project in 2002.24 One interviewee told us that “complex and
literally never-ending discussions with provincial and central authorities occurred
over the project’s feasibility.”25
The breakthrough came in November 2003, when the Party secretary of
Guangdong (who was also a member of the Politburo) and the railways minister
agreed to speed up railway development in Guangdong through the PMA
scheme. Guangdong’s Party secretary was concerned that the lagging railway
infrastructure would hinder the province’s rapidly developing economy. Up
until the end of 2004, transportation in Guangdong relied heavily on highways.
The total rail length in the province was 1,883 kilometres, accounting for only
2.56 per cent of the total rail length in China and ranking among the bottom
four of all provinces. A deputy governor lamented that “this is totally out of pro-
portion with the robust economic growth of Guangdong whose output represents
23 People’s Daily. 2002. “Guangdong to build 139.8 km express railway to Zhuhai.” 25 November.
24 Zhuhai tequ bao. 2005. “Xiujian Guang–Zhu tielu, shixian bainian mengxiang” (Build the Guangzhou–
Zhuhai railway, fulfil a 100 year-old dream). 20 May.
25 Interview with Zhuhai government official, Zhuhai, July 2008.
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almost 10 per cent of the national total.”26 The slow growth of its rail infrastruc-
ture would place the PRD in a disadvantageous position in the national econ-
omic landscape. Thus, the Party secretary ordered provincial departments to
devise a Guangdong Railway Development Plan.
The shifting of provincial investment priorities to railroads provided Zhuhai
with an unprecedented opportunity to resume GZR. The city swiftly resumed
its lobbying of the State Council, MOR, provincial authorities and key leaders.
However, several key provincial leaders still disliked the idea owing to
Zhuhai’s reputation for circumventing provincial and central regulations to con-
struct mega projects without proper authorization.27 Zhuhai then decided to pro-
pose that GZR would serve mainly as a freight line in order to avoid overlapping
with the intercity passenger line. It was argued that a cargo line was needed to
complement highway and water transport, and to meet the growing cargo
demand resulting from the rapid industrial growth and port development in
Zhuhai and Jiangmen.28
These persistent efforts finally paid off and Guangdong decided to include
GZR in the Railway Development Plan. This decision was taken and agreed
upon by the Party secretary, a deputy governor of Guangdong and the railways
minister when the three of them took part in a training course at the Party School
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.29 Soon after that, the deputy
secretary and the mayor of Zhuhai led a delegation to meet the railways minister
in Beijing where they reached a consensus that MOR would invest in GZR as a
controlling shareholder.30 This implies that GZR was upgraded to central project
status under the PMA scheme. The railways minister stated that “the line will
definitely make a profit because it links up with major ports in Zhuhai and
Jiangmen.”31 In October 2004, Guangdong and MOR officially signed an agree-
ment to speed up railway development in the province and GZR was identified as
one of nine railways to be built by 2020.
It appears from our interviews and preceding discussions that one of the key
areas of contention was the economic justification of GZR. During the
26 Yangcheng wanbao. 2007. “Guang–Zhu tielu tizhi gaibian” (Guangzhou–Zhuhai railway changes sta-
tus). 15 January.
27 One such project is the Lingding Yang Bridge. In 1997, Zhuhai began construction of its own cross-delta
Lingding Yang Bridge, which was proposed by its Party secretary in the late 1980s to link Zhuhai and
Hong Kong. This project was undertaken without provincial and central approval and without any
communication with Hong Kong. It was halted three years later after little progress. The Lingding
Yang folly was exceeded by that of the Zhuhai Airport. Opening for flights in 1995, it was built at a
cost of more than US$840 million, but only operates at less than 5 per cent of its annual capacity of
10 million passengers. Zhuhai Airport was built in accordance with the standards of an international
airport for which it had no proper authorization. Today, it is still a domestic airport and has not
been granted permission to host international flights. In 2005, the airport owed at least US$1.5 billion
in domestic liabilities, losing a further US$2.4 million per month.
28 NDRC 2004.
29 Interview with Zhuhai government official.
30 Ibid.
31 Yangcheng wanbao. 2007. “Guang–Zhu tielu tizhi gaibian” (Guangzhou–Zhuhai railway changes sta-
tus). 15 January.
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negotiation process, interscalar politics is evident between MOR, Guangdong,
and Zhuhai, where Zhuhai was fighting with Guangdong and lobbying central
ministries (e.g. MOR and NDRC) to justify the economic rationales of GZR.
Clearly, there is a redefined interscalar regime, where local governments can
play an active role in the negotiation for project authorization and planning.
Zhuhai tended to go beyond the economic logic and its budgetary constraints
to overemphasize the project’s benefits, while Guangdong remained unconvinced
by the claimed financial return. The interscalar negotiations resulted in a long
bargaining process. Zhuhai’s leaders used strategies which were contingent
upon their resources and position in the government hierarchy in order to trans-
form policies, to influence the decision-making process, and to jump through
scales in order to seek central support. They also utilized the wider
social-political-economic contexts (e.g. Guangdong’s decision to facilitate rail-
way investment) to promote GZR. Zhuhai compromised on contentious issues
too (e.g. giving up the passenger function of GZR). All in all, the city attempted
to influence policy decision through persistent struggles to bargain with central
and provincial authorities and to legitimize the project in the name of new pol-
itical and economic legitimacy. In one interview, we were told that “political fac-
tors are key, because they reinforce the bargaining power; administrative capital
counts, while sometimes cost–benefit analysis counts for nothing.”32
Local opposition
Another contentious issue was local opposition from cities along the route of
GZR. This is a key dimension of both intercity and interscalar politics. Zhuhai
and Jiangmen would benefit most from GZR, while Foshan would contribute
excessive land resources (in proportion to its benefits). Guangzhou remained
indifferent, because it was already an established transportation hub in southern
China and the outcome of the GZR proposal would not affect this status either
way.33 Several rounds of intense negotiations were conducted to redress these
imbalances.
In the mid-1990s, Zhuhai’s leaders took the initiative to negotiate with the
other cities concerned. Guangzhou agreed to build the line but refused to fund
this project. Foshan strongly opposed the project as it would not benefit greatly
from a new line and the proposed route cut through its city districts, a planned
high-end residential community, and a golf course. GZR would disturb its
municipal planning and incur substantial costs in land acquisition and resettle-
ment. Also, the city is close to Guangzhou, and already has a railway link to
Guangzhou. Jiangmen supported the idea but did not want to pay for it.
Although poorer and of a lower status than the other cities in many respects,
Jiangmen was in a position to delay the process of “closing” a deal.
32 Interview with Zhuhai government official; interview with Zhuhai planner, Zhuhai, July 2008.
33 Interview with Guangzhou planner, Guangzhou, July 2008.
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These disagreements gave rise to scepticism about Zhuhai’s political and econ-
omic capacity to coordinate the joint project. One interviewee recounted:
One reason why Zhuhai failed to reach consensus with other cities was because of its low admin-
istrative status. As a prefecture-level city, it did not have the power to coordinate a project with
Guangzhou (a sub-provincial city) as well as Foshan and Jiangmen (two prefecture-level cities).
The only remaining option was to lobby the provincial and central governments to intervene
because Zhuhai’s Party secretary was a key provincial leader. However, with the investment
focus on highways, the province was unresponsive to this request. Worse still, Zhuhai and
Jiangmen were too restricted by their merger incomes to finance the costly project in full.34
However, despite all these uncertainties, the first round of negotiations resulted in
a written agreement between Zhuhai, Jiangmen and MOR (but not Guangzhou
and Foshan) that specified investment allocation. A GZR Partnership
Corporation was established, with a registered capital in cash set at US$120
million. Zhuhai would contribute 80 per cent, while Jiangmen and MOR
would contribute 10 per cent each.35 In October 1997, a ceremony was held in
Zhuhai to announce the start of the construction work which was expected to
be completed by 2001. Not surprisingly, construction soon ground to a halt
owing to a lack of capital – Zhuhai, which had pledged to contribute US$96.8
million, only managed to pay US$9.6 million, with Jiangmen and MOR adding
a meagre US$400,000 and US$970,000, respectively.
To keep the project afloat, Zhuhai lobbied the State Planning Commission and
six other ministries for their support. In 1998, the Commission granted the pro-
ject consent to borrow US$100 million capital from a Japanese bank and also a
permit to issue US$24 million in bonds. The Commission also made the rec-
ommendation to the State Development Bank that a US$145 million loan be
granted to the project.36 However, this funding was conditional upon the GZR
Partnership Corporation finding US$121 million in initial funding. At that
time, Zhuhai had already amassed a large amount of debt from several contro-
versial, large-scale projects during the 1990s,37 and so it was unable to find the
funds needed for GZR.38 The project was brought to a deadlock.
In 2000, Zhuhai decided to embark upon another round of negotiations. The
process was even tougher than the previous round, as now Foshan’s Party sec-
retary had been appointed as a member of the standing committee of the
Guangdong Communist Party Committee. Foshan, now having someone in
the highest decision-making body of Guangdong, would be more influential in
imposing its bargaining constraints. Foshan’s leaders continually argued that
there was no incentive for them to join the project.39 This would cause further
delay because the railway had to pass through Foshan’s territory. In order to




37 See footnote 27.
38 NDRC 2004.
39 Interview with Foshan planning officer, Foshan, August 2009.
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persuade Foshan to cooperate, Zhuhai’s Party secretary led a delegation of key
officials, including the deputy secretary, mayor and vice mayors, to visit
Foshan and Jiangmen.40 In Foshan, the delegation met with a group of local lea-
ders for one whole day, but the GZR project was not even mentioned. As one
interviewee described it, “the contradiction is sharp.”41 In Jiangmen, the situation
was a bit better. Local officials expressed their full support but still refused to
contribute financially. They argued that Jiangmen was not an affluent city and
could not afford to fund a costly project. This round of negotiations then came
to a dead end. As one interviewee put it, “conflicts that cannot be resolved by
individual cities have to be handled by higher levels.”42
The Party secretary of Guangdong then personally went to Foshan to persuade
the city’s Party secretary to cooperate. The justification was that Foshan should
consider regional interests rather than its own economic benefits. Following inter-
vention from such a powerful person, Foshan finally agreed to resume nego-
tiations. However, the suggested route of GZR, as mentioned above, would
seriously disturb both Foshan’s approved urban master plan and land use plan
as it would pass through the city’s core and a high-end residential district. This
would incur pricey land compensation and resettlement costs which, estimated
at US$363 million, almost equalled the first-phase US$411 million railway con-
struction costs.43 We were told in a 2008 interview that “Foshan has no particular
need for the railway; therefore it is not fair for the city to bear the cost without
just compensation.”44
Then, a Byzantine process of negotiation occurred: Foshan threatened to not
grant a land use permit for GZR, but was finally persuaded to cooperate if
two supplementary conditions were satisfied. First, the route had to be modified
to avoid passing through the core of the city and the amount of land that required
acquisition had to be reduced, even though this might add a further 40 kilometres
to the original length. Secondly, Foshan would not contribute any investment,
either in cash or land costs. Considering the fact that GZR would not contribute
any tangible benefit to Foshan, MOR and Guangdong accepted these sup-
plementary conditions. However, the modified route passed through the city of
Jiangmen, which refused to cooperate unless a further modification was made
to keep the rail away from the city centre.45 Again, this modification increased
the rail length and investment required. Jiangmen also refused to fund the pro-
ject. After much persuasion by provincial leaders and MOR, Jiangmen unwil-
lingly agreed to contribute 5 per cent. One interviewee explained, “Foshan and
Jiangmen made demands, knowing that the cost of meeting their desires would
40 Interview with Zhuhai government official.
41 Interview with Zhuhai government official; interview with Zhuhai planner; interview with Guangzhou
planner; interview with Foshan planning officer.
42 Interview with Zhuhai government official.
43 NDRC 2004.
44 Interview with Foshan planning officer.
45 Interview with Jiangmen government officer, Jiangmen, August 2009.
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not come from their own pockets, because the majority of expenditures are
charged against the budgets of Zhuhai, Guangdong, and MOR.”46 The results
of these negotiations was that no city gained all they wished for but no city
was forced to give up all that was demanded of them either, and the line length
and financial expenditure rose more gradually than would have been the case had
it proceeded with the initial plan.
The controversies surrounding local opposition reflect the intercity and intersca-
lar political dimensions of GZR. Intercity networking is increasingly used in place
of hierarchical command, and decisions are no longer arbitrarily imposed upon
localities. Rather, there is a significant increase in the use of bargaining in
order to reach consensus. Bargaining occurs between different scales of govern-
ments (e.g. the province and Foshan) and between cities of the same or different
ranks. Zhuhai could not carry out GZR without the cooperation of the other
cities. The lack of formal regulation forces actors to adopt loose and flexible
ways to conduct intercity negotiations. With a weak bureaucratic status, Zhuhai
failed to persuade other cities to cooperate, but it succeeded in inviting senior lea-
ders to compel and persuade the cities to cooperate. The intervention of higher
level authority is contingent upon both internally generated (e.g. Guangdong’s
economic policies) and externally driven (e.g. inter-region competition) factors.
Therefore, it is also one means by which established hierarchies endeavour to
insert their functional importance in urban and regional governance. The GZR
case also unravels the interaction between intercity and interscalar politics: con-
flicts have to be resolved among interdependent localities, but when that fails,
the vertical interscalar system can facilitate timely and appropriate cooperation.
Investment allocations and project approval
The problems surrounding investment allocation also highlight interscalar and
inter-ministry politics. The first investment agreement was signed in 1997, before
Guangdong promised to join the project. This agreement required that Zhuhai
should contribute 80 per cent of the US$120 million registered capital in cash,
while Jiangmen and MOR would contribute 10 per cent each. This initial plan
failed because Zhuhai was not able to be the lead agency in planning and imple-
menting this expensive, time consuming and politically difficult project. For
instance, one interviewee explained, “Zhuhai’s financial capacity is weak, and
the city leaders wish to invite MOR to be the controlling shareholder so that
the new line will be part of the national railway system and will be more finan-
cially viable.”47
In 2004, Guangdong and MOR signed an agreement to speed up railway
investment in Guangdong under the PMA scheme. GZR was upgraded to a
national line under this scheme. An investment sharing deal was then brokered
46 Interview with Zhuhai government official.
47 Interview with Zhuhai officer, Beijing, August 2009.
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after six rounds of province–ministry meetings: MOR became the controlling
shareholder (40 per cent of the registered capital in cash), and the two cities of
Jiangmen (5 per cent) and Zhuhai (30 per cent) would participate by contributing
capital and/or land cost. Guangdong provincial government promised to contrib-
ute 25 per cent. The remaining capital was to be raised by inviting domestic and
overseas investors. All in all, MOR became the lead investment agency.
However, this deal triggered a battle between MOR and NDRC. NDRC dis-
liked the idea of MOR being the controlling shareholder, and threatened not to
authorize the project.48 It intended to encourage reforms in the railway industry
in order to break MOR’s monopoly, and to shift the focus of public investment
away from the relatively better-off coastal regions and to inland provinces
instead.49 However, MOR looks set to increase its monopoly,50 and Zhuhai
saw that it was in its own interests to come under the umbrella of this monopoly.
In an interview in 2010, an expert on the railway industry described the situation:
most short and long-distance local and joint venture railways have to link up with existing
national railways to carry passengers and cargos between origins and destinations. However,
passenger and freight schedule planning of national railways, railroad interlockings and traffic
flow are all under the direct control of MOR. Due to capacity constraints, MOR and its
regional bureaus have been reluctant to allocate scare network slots to joint ventures. Almost
all local and joint venture railroads which are not primarily controlled by MOR have been dis-
criminated against, leading to profit loss. To ensure sufficient cargo flow, Zhuhai struggled to
protect the future profit base of GZR, and it has to negotiate long and hard for the best possible
solution.51
After failing to bring NDRC on board with their plan, MOR, Zhuhai and
Guangdong moved to transform the investment sharing scheme. In 2006, a
new agreement was signed which required four partners to contribute 40 per
cent of the total project cost. MOR was no longer the controlling shareholder
and its funding share was reduced from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. Guangdong
would take 25 per cent, while Zhuhai and Jiangmen would contribute 50 and 5
per cent, respectively. The remaining investment would be provided by bank
loans. However, Zhuhai had concerns about this funding scheme as without
MOR as the lead agency, there would be a degree of uncertainty about the pro-
ject’s return.52 Despite these reservations, in January 2007, a new GZR company
was established, and in September that year, NDRC approved the feasibility
study. Construction on the project was soon resumed and, at that time, was esti-
mated to be completed by 2011.
Other inter-ministry politics also played a role in slowing down the project.
The project proposal was not endorsed by either the Ministry of
Environmental Protection or the Ministry of Land and Resources as it failed
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Interview with five MOR planners and researchers, Beijing, December 2010; interview with well-known
university professor, an expert on the railway industry in China, Beijing, June 2009 and July 2010.
51 Interview with well-known university professor, an expert on the railway industry in China, Beijing,
December 2010.
52 Interview with Zhuhai officer.
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environmental impact assessments and was the cause of many land disputes. The
negotiating process produced a modified plan, in which both the length of the
railway and investment required were substantially increased owing to the line
being rerouted. The new route was now estimated to cost approximately US
$1.5 billion, with a distance of 187 kilometres and 11 stations. Increased costs
were down to extra track, signalling, earthworks, environmental mitigation (e.g.
an extra tunnel was required to protect a nature reserve in Jiangmen) and land
acquisition.
The inter-ministry politics involved in the reaching of a consensus in the invest-
ment allocation plan and project approval demonstrate that competing central
ministries are still important to the functioning of interjurisdictional polity.
Specific ministries may have interests and policy preferences which diverge from
those of other ministries. Their conflicts intersect in localities to influence urban
and regional policy-making, and also redefine the interscalar regime. For example,
NDRC refused to allow MOR to be the lead investment agency, which redefined
the investment sharing between different hierarchical governments.
Market-led versus state-led?
In recent years, MOR has frequently put forward the idea of introducing market
mechanisms to the railway industry. During the 1990s, when GZR was still pro-
posed as a local joint venture railway, several domestic and overseas investors
expressed an interest. One even signed a contract with Zhuhai53 that proposed
using non-state capital to make up the shortfall. However, all investors withdrew
after 2004 when GZR was incorporated into the national railway plan under the
PMA scheme. When discussing this, one interviewee explained:
Given the circumstances, non-state investors are required to share investment risks and obli-
gations, but are declined to share rights … MOR does not easily grant schedules and trackage
rights to railway lines which it does not control… these railroads cannot be independent or get
a status equal to the national railway; therefore, interests of non-state investors cannot be
guaranteed.54
Without a market to match supply and demand, elaborate bargaining has further
developed to fill the void. At the time of writing this paper, the negotiation pro-
cess as detailed above had finished and several major construction works (e.g.
bridges and terminals) for this project had been completed. The railroad became
operational at the end of 2012.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper attempts to examine interjurisdictional cooperation in China. In par-
ticular, it has sought to provide a circumspect appraisal of the institutional
dimensions and bargaining politics of such a practice and, in the process, offer
53 Interview with Zhuhai government official.
54 Interview with well-known university professor, an expert on the railway industry in China, Beijing,
December 2010.
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something of a rejoinder to the question as to how a partnership can be devel-
oped, sustained or even resisted in a transitional society. Although there is an
emerging trend of interjurisdictional partnerships in China, it must be acknowl-
edged that such practices expose a number of dimensions which could conceiva-
bly be enhanced. From the case study of GZR, three key themes can be
highlighted.
First, interjurisdictional bargaining is a differentiated socio-political process
constructed around various places, spaces, and scales in a context-sensible way.
It is in this context that we have sought to identify the complexity and bargaining
process surrounding the GZR project and four institutional dimensions of mak-
ing it work among interested parties and across their representative political econ-
omic geographies. The case leads to some understanding of the complex
processes through which cooperation is achieved. We observe that even once a
partnership is formed and adopted, the implementation process is characterized
by negotiation among and between levels of the hierarchy. Each agent aims to
steer the plan in a direction favourable to its own interests. The outcome may
not be as originally intended, but it is worked out through extensive bargaining.
Secondly, in unravelling the politically constructed nature of the emerging
interjurisdictional regime, we are witnessing a recomposition or qualitative reor-
ganization of the regime. Inter-ministry politics demonstrates a range of competi-
tive central interests which intersect at provincial and city level to influence urban
and regional policy making. Interscalar relations have been fundamentally rede-
fined. Top–down hierarchical dominance in decision making has been denatura-
lized, while local governments can influence policy decisions through their
political and economic resources. In terms of intercity politics, cities which are
not connected with each other have to seek partnership in order to overcome hur-
dles in capital accumulation. Because the institutional framework for horizontal
networking is poorly developed, they need to play a more active role in partner-
ship building and must resolve conflicts through extensive bargaining. We also
note a bargaining between the state and the market. The state would like to use
the market to externalize its responsibility of building costly projects and resolve
its capital shortage crisis. This is totally different from the pre-reform state
regime. However, state–market relations did not work out in the GZR case
because non-state investors were asked to share risks and obligations, but were
not allowed to benefit from rights under MOR’s monopoly. In a sense, bargain-
ing, rather than being on the decline in the post-reform era, has become compul-
sory, and is increasingly intensified in order to fill the institutional void in a
highly fragmented political environment.
Thirdly, we have also examined how the historical contingencies and path-
dependencies of a transitional society define and configure partnership building.
Under the conditions of intensified economic decentralization and without a
proper legal framework, high level governments are still capable of exerting
their influence over local and regional growth. This complicates interscalar
relations. For example, Guangdong forced Foshan to release land for GZR.
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Top authorities can determine local government behaviour by altering opportu-
nities and constraints on collective actions. Various actors opt for irregular and
ad hoc procedures to resolve conflicts, allowing room for externalities, such as
informal contacts, political wills, and factors like unequal urban status and
guanxi, as indicated in the case study. In particular, the strong influence of pol-
itical wills complicates project negotiation and selection processes. Theoretically,
each government adheres to its own cost–benefit criteria for project acceptance,
but joint projects may well be constrained by contextually specific non-economic
factors. GZR is a good example. Zhuhai’s Party secretary went beyond economic
logic to kick-start the project. The intervention of senior officials from top auth-
orities made the collaboration possible, even when the majority of participants
had no economic incentive to do so. However, an individual-driven collaboration
increases the political risk, because the party who agrees to cooperate may not be
the one in charge of its implementation in the future. A combination of these fac-
tors will subject joint projects to extensive assessments and consultation, endless
(re)negotiation, stonewalling, and even withdrawal from agreement. Our study
also suggests that intervention from the state or politicians is less shaped by econ-
omic logic and formal institution and more by the same political conflicts (e.g.
conflicts between and among different territorial administrations and competitive
bureaucracies) that they are supposed to help alleviate.
In this case study, we have revealed that interjurisdictional cooperation has
unique characteristics in the context of economic transition, because the state
can go beyond economic logic, manipulate market orders, and legitimize itself
by prioritizing development. This is reflected in inter-ministry politics, interscalar
relations, intercity politics, and state–market relations. GZR is a particularly
interesting case. On one hand, China’s railroads have been traditionally managed
by MOR in a highly centralized manner. On the other hand, facing severe rail
capacity constraints and little freedom to change the situation, provinces and
cities have to call on MOR to finance, build and operate joint venture railways.
MOR welcomes such a move because it means a reduction of its financial obli-
gations with little loss of its authority. In a sense, the railway monopoly and
rapid expansion have coincided with a severe shortage of capital and thus the
urgency for the involvement of localities and market players. This situation has
complicated joint railway projects, pushing all kinds of bargaining politics to
the extreme. It also allows significant room for established hierarchies to insert
their functional importance and avoid takeovers by market forces.
All in all, we show that path-dependencies can provide current political forces
with more, rather than fewer, instruments with which to negotiate economic tra-
jectories and thus impose greater influence over local and regional governance.
Bargaining is being used as a strategy for this purpose. Until there is a legal frame-
work for interjurisdictional cooperation, bargaining may remain as the main
method in consensus building. From a broader perspective, a growing direct inter-
action between cities may lead to widely shared values, procedures and norms in
interjurisdictional cooperation. Whether or not this can develop into a legal
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framework remains to be seen. Yet, future studies of new cooperation practices
should be significantly advanced to reveal the currently unfolding regional initiat-
ives in China.
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